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Impacts of Highway Infrastructure Investment 
Under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act
by Seong-Hoon Cho, Daegoon Lee, Dayton M. Lambert, and Roland K. Roberts
This study evaluated the impact on highway demand of highway disbursements under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Vehicle miles traveled were used to estimate a highway 
demand equation employing a spatial Durbin model for the 48 contiguous U.S. states during 1994-
2008. Estimates from the equation were used to test the hypothesis that highway disbursements 
caused	different	upward	shifts	in	the	highway	demand	curves	of	states.	We	estimated	$8.2	billion	in	
total	net	benefits	for	the	48	states	as	a	result	of	the	$27.2	billion	in	ARRA	highway	disbursements,	
yielding	an	average	net	benefit	of	$0.30	per	dollar	spent.
INTRODUCTION
After the United States entered an economic recesssion in December 2007, President Obama signed 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) into law in February 2009 (Romer 2009). 
The ARRA legislated $787 billion in spending by the federal government under three types of 
funding programs: $228 billion for tax benefits, $275 billion for contracts, grants and loans, and 
$224 billion for entitlement spending that included education, unemployment, compensation, food 
stamps, health care insurance, and other social programs.1 Spending aimed to create employment 
oppportunities and save existing jobs (Recovery 2012). The stimulus package focused mainly on 
saving and creating jobs with ready-to-go (referred to as “shovel-ready”) projects that could start 
straightaway (Berrens et al. 2002; Johnson 2009). Some of the most common shovel-ready projects 
funded under the ARRA were related to transportation (Rall 2009). Of the $48.1 billion in ARRA 
funds designated for transportation contracts, grants, and loans, $27.5 billion was allocated to 
highway infrastructure investment (Recovery 2012). 
The ARRA highway disbursement was intended to satisfy increasing demand for highways, 
recondition aging infrastructure, improve road security and safety, and ease traffic congestion 
(U.S. Department of Transportation 2012). The highway investment component of the ARRA was 
particularly important as the U.S. transportation infrastructure has been in need of renovation for 
many years. Estimates suggest the U.S. economy lost $90 billion in 2010 due to poor transportation 
infrastructure (American Society of Civil Engineers 2011). The ARRA highway disbursement was 
expected to improve transportation infrastructure and, thus, mitigate some of the negative economic 
effects stemming from poor highway conditions.
The objective of this research is to explore the impacts of ARRA highway disbursements, 
focusing on the cost of the additional highway usage for each of the 48 contiguous states, and the 
benefits of increased highway usage in each state measured by changes in consumer welfare. The 
state-level cost-benefit analysis is based on the hypothesis that different levels of ARRA highway 
disbursements, ceteris paribus, shift the state-level demand curves for highway miles upward by 
different amounts. The hypothesis is premised on the notion that differences in ARRA highway 
disbursements are expected to improve the quality of state-level highway systems differently (e.g., 
time saved due to new and expanded facilities, reduced user costs, improved safety, greater passenger 
comfort, security, convenience and reliability, and/or less damage to goods and freighters).
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The hypothesis was tested by estimating a highway demand equation using panel data at the 
state level for the 1995-2008 period. The price of highway usage was proxied by the sum of the 
average cost of gasoline ($/mile) and the opportunity cost of travel time ($/mile). Highway demand 
was represented by vehicle miles traveled (i.e., total number of miles traveled during a year by 
all vehicles within a state) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2012). Ex	post simulations of 
the highway demand equation with and without the ARRA highway disbursement using 2009 and 
2010 data generated predicted changes in highway usage for each state. The simulated changes in 
highway usage were used to estimate changes in consumer welfare from upward shifts in the state-
level demand curves, reflecting benefits from the improved quality and quantity of highway systems.
Determining the cost of ARRA highway disbursements requires estimates of both explicit cost 
(i.e., cost of ARRA highway disbursement) and implicit cost (i.e., cost of negative externalities 
including air pollution and traffic congestion). While the explicit cost is obtained directly from the 
government’s official website, attaining the implicit cost involves multiple modeling efforts (e.g., 
contingent valuation of air pollution and estimation of total congestion cost including travel time 
delays, vehicle operating costs, and social costs of traffic congestion) that are beyond the scope of 
this research. Thus, the estimates of implicit costs of the additional highway usage due to ARRA 
higway disbursements were taken directly from previous research.
Our research contributes to the literature in the following way. To the best of our knowledge, 
our macro-scale cost-benefit analysis of the ARRA highway disbursement at the national and the 
state levels is the first attempt of its kind. While the literature has firmly established micro-level 
cost-benefit analysis of highway investment that typically evaluates user benefits and external costs 
for alternative transportation projects, there appears to be no previous attempt to assess the impact 
of macro-scale highway investment. For example, Cost-Benefit Analysis (COBA) (Department 
of Transport, UK 2012), the Micro-computer Benefit Cost Analysis Model (MicroBENCOST) 
(McFarland et al. 1993), and the Strategic Benefit Cost Analysis Model (StratBENCOST) (National 
Cooperative Highway Research Program 2004) evaluate the costs and benefits of specific highway 
improvement projects at the local level.
By estimating state-level highway demand curves for use in evaluating nationwide investment, 
such as the ARRA highway disbursement, we quantify the benefits of increased highway usage at 
both the national and the state levels. Using our benefit estimates and the explicit and implicit costs 
of the ARRA highway disbursement, we estimate the impacts of the ARRA highway disbursement 
on the aggregate 48 contiguous states and on each state individually. This analysis is meaningful in 
that the results offer, big picture as well as local impacts of nationwide investment in transportation 
systems. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL
Highway Demand Equation
Based on relationships found in the previous literature (Noland 2001; Choo et al. 2004; Small 
and Van Dender 2005; Washington State Department of Transprotation 2010), highway demand 
q (measured by vehicle miles traveled) is specified as a function of the price of highway usage p 
(proxied by the sum of the average cost of gasoline per mile and the cost of travel time per mile), 
highway disbursements d, and other exogenous factors g, including the number of licensed drivers 
to represent the population of highway consumers, per capita income to reflect other socio-economic 
characteristics, and total highway miles within a state:
(1) q = f (p, d, g)
Assuming constant elasticity of demand, we linearize the demand equation by taking natural 
logarithms of the continuous variables and denote them by capital letters:
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(2)  ,
where i and t represent the state and year; Xi,t is a 1 × 4 row vector of explanatory variables, including 
P and G; α and γ are scalar parameters; β a  4 × 1 parameter vector; and ε is an error term. Highway 
disbursements (D) are lagged one year (t-1) because the largest portion of disbursements was for 
maintanance and capital outlays—land acquistion, design, construction, reconstruction, resurfacing, 
rehabilitation, installation of guard rails, and fencing—and most of those activities would likely 
cause some delay in facilitating highway usage. The terms μ and λ, respectively, denote unobserved 
state-specific and time-specific effects.2 
The equation (2) intrinsically involves a spatial network system because the highway vehicle 
miles of states located near one another may have unobserved characteristics that are correlated 
across states. These unobserved characteristics represent the spatial autocorrelation of the highway 
demand as an unobserved spatial process. For example, there may be spatial spillover impacts on 
vehicle miles traveled in states neighboring the states where the funds were disbursed. We take 
account of the spatial spillover impacts by framing the highway deamand equation in a spatial 
regression model that accounts for such spatial dependence (LeSage and Pace 2009; Parent and 
LeSage 2010). Inclusion of the spatially lagged depdendent variable assumes that highway demand 
in one location is codetermined by demand for highways in neighboring regions. 
Following a routine suggested by Elhorst (2010), we tested the non-spatial highway demand 
equation against the corresponding spatial model. We specified the highway demand equation as a 
spatial Durbin model for panel data (SDMP) that include both spatial lag, error, and cross-regressive 
structures (Anselin 1988; LeSage and Pace 2009): 
(3) 
 
where subscripts i and j represent the ith and jth states, wij is element (i, j) of the N × N spatial weight 
matrix W  whose diagonal elements are zero ,
1
N
ij j t
j
w Q
=
∑ , is annual vehicle miles traveled within the 
neighbors defined by the spatial weight matrix W, ρ is a parameter of spatially lagged annual vehicle 
miles, ψ  is a parameter of spatially lagged highway disbursement, and  is a 4 × 1 parameter vector 
of spatially lagged independent variables. We estimated the highway demand equation with a fixed 
effect model allowing for arbitrary correlation between the 48 contiguous U.S. states’ heterogeneity 
and other explanatory variables. The lag AR term ρ explains this dependence. If the covariates are 
measured with error, and those measurement errors are correlated across spatial units, then inclusion 
of the error correlation term is warranted. If level effects of neighboring covariates determine 
highway expenditures, then the cross-regressive terms are important. These hypotheses can be 
tested to determine if the SDM, or some nested version of the SDM model, is suitable. 
Estimation Procedure
Based on the specification results and the panel data model discussed above, the highway demand 
equation was estimated by maximum likelihood.3 In the spatial regression model, interpretation of the 
estimates, i.e.,  and , is not straightforward because spatial spillover effects play signficant roles 
in determining the marginal effects of the variables (LeSage and Pace 2009). Applying the approach 
by LeSage and Pace (2009), the total marginal effect of a change in an explanatory variable in state 
i on vehicle miles traveled in the 48 U.S. states was decomposed into the effect on vehicle miles 
traveled in state i as a direct marginal effect (hereafter referred to as direct effect) and the effect on 
vehicle miles traveled outside state i as an indirect marginal effect (hereafter, referred to as indirect 
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effect).4 The direct effect refers to the combination of (1) the effect of an explanatory variable for 
the ith state on vehicle miles traveled in the ith state and (2) the effect passing through neighboring 
regions that exert a feedback influence on vehicle miles traveled of the ith state (referred to as 
“feedback effect”). The indirect effect refers to the sum of the effects of an explanatory variable for 
the ith state on vehicle miles traveled in the other states (-i). The total effect is the sum of the direct 
and indirect effects, which denote the effect of a one-unit change in an explanatory variable on the 
aggregate vehicle miles traveled in all 48 states. 
Cost-benefit Analysis With and Without ARRA Highway Disbursement
Using the parameter estimates from Equation (3), the highway demand curves for vehicle miles 
traveled in state i 1) in the absence of ARRA highway disbursements to any of the 48 states ( ), 
2) with the ARRA dibursement to state i only ( ), and 3) with the ARRA distbursements to 
each of the 48 states ( ) are: 
 
(4-1) 
(4-2) 
(4-3) 
 
, 
where wo denotes without ARRA disbursements to any state, own represents the case where only 
state i  receives its ARRA disbursement with all other states not being funded, all represents the case 
where all 48 states receive their ARRA disbursements, i indexes states, D is highway disbursements 
in 2009, X is a matrix of explanatory variables (i.e., the price of highway usage, per capita income, 
length of highway, and number of licensed drivers) in 2010, and  ii is an N  by 1 unit vector with the 
ith element being 1 and the other elements being 0. Note that we obtain 48 different predicted values 
for equation (4-2) since Down,i  varies by i = 1,…,48. Equation (4-2) is constructed to see what would 
have been the effect of ARRA disbursement in a state if only that state had been funded with ARRA 
disbursement. While comparing the predicted values from equations (4-3) and (4-1) shows the total 
effect of ARRA disbursements on highway demand, comparing those from equations (4-3) and (4-2) 
shows the portion of the total effect resulting from spillovers. Intuitively, the difference between the 
predicted values from (4-3) and (4-2) is the effect of other states’ ARRA disbursements on state i’s 
demand for highway use.
Once predicted vehicle miles traveled are obtained, we draw three different constant-elasticity 
demand curves for each state. The inverse demand curves for each of the 48 states are , 
   and , where  ,  ,  and   denote all factors including ARRA disbursements 
that shift the demand curves of state i (referred to as “demand curve shifter”), and    and   
are price flexibilities (inverse price elasticities). 
An important question deals with which value is an appropriate estimate for the price elasticity. 
As pointed out in the section Estimation Procedure, the parameter estimate for the price elasticity 
βp is not the marginal effect because it does not reflect spatial iterations. The total effect includes 
the indirect effect, which by definition represents changes in demand caused by price changes in 
neighboring states. Because highway use in neighboring states is either a substitute or complement 
to one's own state highway use, a price change in neighboring states shifts the one's own state 
demand curve rather than changing its price elasticity of demand.
Hypothetical highway demand curves corresponding to,    are shown in Figure 1. 
The relationships among the demand curves,   are hypothesized 
because we expect ARRA highway disbursements to shift the demand curve for state i to the right, 
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and the vehicle miles traveled with ARRA highway disbursement in all 48 states are expected to 
increase more than in a given state because of positive spillover effects. 
Given the estimated highway demand curves, the benefits of increased vehicle miles traveled 
for each state due to the ARRA highway disbursement in a given state and in all 48 states were 
estimated by calculating the additional consumer surplus attributed to the right shifts in the highway 
demand curves in a state and in all 48 states (shown as  in Figure 1). The additional 
consumer surplus due to the ARRA highway disbursements in all 48 states was calculated by 
integrating the area :
(5)   
where iq  is an arbitrarily chosen but reasonably low cutoff value (i.e., vehicle miles traveled 
corresponding to a price ceiling of 100 times pi,2010  in the inverse demand curve  ). The area 
 was calculated likewise. The decomposition of  ΔCSall into ΔCSown, and i s 
meaningful because ΔCSown  measures the additional consumer surplus  in a given state related to the 
ARRA highway disbursement in that state, while  it measures the additional consumer surplus in the 
given state related to the ARRA highway disbursements in the other states (referred to as “spillover 
consumer welfare”). 
Figure 1:  Estimated Demand Curves Without and With ARRA Highway    
 Disbursement in a Given State and in All 48 States
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The difference between the predicted vehicle miles traveled with and without ARRA highway 
disbursements in all 48 states  was multiplied by $0.09 per mile (taken directly from Litman 
and Doherty (2009)—see details in the Study Area and Data section) to calculate the additional 
implicit cost of negative externalities. Subsequently, the total net benefit for each state from the 
ARRA highway disbursements was calculated by subtracting the sum of explicit and implicit costs 
from total additional consumer surplus. The net benefits were aggregated across states to arrive at 
the total net benefit from ARRA highway disbursements to the 48 contiguous states. 
STUDY AREA  AND DATA
The cross-sectional data used to estimate the highway demand curves pertain to the 48 contiguous 
U.S. states for 15 years (1994-2008). Similar cross-sectional data for 2009’s ARRA highway 
disbursements and the other explanatory variables for 2010 were used to simulate the impact of 
time-lagged ARRA highway disbursements on highway demand in 2010. Data for the 2009 ARRA 
highway disbursements by state were obtained from www.recovery.gov, the U.S. government’s 
official website (Recovery 2012). The annual retail price of gasoline was obtained from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (U.S. Energy Information Agency 2012); per capita income 
was collected from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (USDC BEA 
2012); and vehicle miles traveled, highway disbursements, length of highways, number of licensed 
drivers, and fuel tax per gallon were obtained from the Highway Statistics series published by 
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (USDOT FHWA 2012). 
Although ARRA disbusements by state were available for 2009, highway disbursements by state 
were not available for that year. Thus, highway disbursements by state in the absence of the 2009 
ARRA disbursements were predicted by each state’s time trend using highway disbursement data 
from 1994 to 2008. 
The average opportunity cost of travel time per mile in the United Sates (i.e., $0.11 per mile) 
was obtained from Litman and Doherty (2009), as was the per-mile cost of congestion, which was 
estimated as a weighted average of congestion levels for urban peak, off-peak, and rural areas, 
multiplied by weighted hourly wages. 
The cost of negative externalities from air pollution and traffic congestion (i.e., $0.09 per 
mile) (Litman and Doherty 2009) was estimated by summing $0.04 for the non-greenhouse gas air 
pollution cost, $0.02 for the greenhouse gas cost, and $0.03 for the congestion cost, all per-average 
vehicle mile traveled. All data, except travel time cost and the costs of negative externalities, 
were obtained at the state level and all dollar values (i.e., gasoline price, travel time cost, highway 
disbursements, and per-capita income) were adjusted to 2007 dollars using the consumer price index 
(U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). Definitions of the variables used in the 
regressions and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
Annual vehicle miles traveled for each state were used to represent highway demand. The 
vehicle miles traveled in the United States steadily increased from 2,342 billion miles in 1994 to 
2,955 billion miles in 2008 (a 26% increase), with the exception of a slight drop in 2008 during the 
recession. As shown in Figure 2a, California and Texas stand out as the states with the most vehicle 
miles traveled during 1994-2008, with 307 and 215 billion miles, respectively, while Delaware, 
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming, Montana, New Hampshire, and 
Idaho had the fewest vehicle miles traveled with fewer than 10 billion miles traveled (see Table 2).
The per-mile retail price of gasoline, state-level fuel tax, and opportunity cost of travel time 
were summed to represent the price of a vehicle mile traveled.5 The retail price of gasoline has 
varied across states with a range of around 10% between the highest and the lowest prices. The West 
Coast and New England are in the higher price range while the Midwest is in the lower price range 
(see Figure 2b). Over the 15 years, average real gasoline prices for individual states have increased 
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Table 1: Variable Names, Descriptions, and Descriptive Statistics
Variable† Description Mean Std Dev
Vehicle miles traveled
(1995-2008)
Annual vehicle distance traveled by all vehicles 
(billion miles)
57.731 57.023
Highway disbursement
(1994-2007)
Total disbursement for highways from all units 
of government ($ billion)
2.644 2.309
Price
(1995-2008)
Sum of gasoline price and opportunity cost of 
travel time ($/mile)
0.200 0.012
Per capita income
(1995-2008)
Per capita income ($ thousand) 34.608 5.547
Length of highway
(1995-2008)
Total highway length (thousand mile) 82.174 50.978
Licensed drivers
(1995-2008)
Total number of licensed drivers (million) 3.984 4.057
† All values are across states and across years.
Figure 2a: Average Vehicle Miles Traveled During 1994-2008 (million miles)
Figure 2b: Gasoline price Per Gallon in 008 ($ per gallon)
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between 131% and 179% (U.S. Energy Information Agency 2012). Fuel taxes that add to the price 
of gasoline differed in 2008 from $0.36 per gallon in West Virginia to $0.08 per gallon in Georgia. 
In the estimation, highway disbursement is total investment in highways by federal, state, and 
local governments (e.g., capital outlay, maintenance and services, administration, and research and 
planning). Between 1994 and 2008, highway disbursement in 2007 dollars increased by 50% from 
$88 billion to $132 billion for the aggregate 48 states. Highway disbursements were highest in 
California, Texas, and New York (over $6 billion per year) on average over the 15 years, while 
Vermont, Rhode Island, and North Dakota had the lowest highway disbursements (less than $0.4 
billion per year). The allocation among states of the $27 billion in ARRA highway disbursement 
amounted to between 12.6% and 47.5% of each state’s highway disbursement in 2008. Correlation 
between state highway disbursements in 2008 and state ARRA highway disbursements was 0.96, 
indicating that the share of the total ARRA disbursement was distributed according to each state’s 
existing share of highway disbursement (see Figures 3a and 3b for the distribution of highway 
disbursement in 2008 and ARRA highway disbursement, respectively). 
Figure 3a: Highway Disbursement in 2008 ($ million)
Figure 3b: ARRA Highway Disbursement in 2009 ($ million)
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Table 2:  Average Vehicle Miles Traveled During 1994-2008, Gasoline Price Per Gallon in 
 2008, Highway Disbursement in 2008, ARRA Highway Disbursement in 2009
Average vehicle miles traveled in 1994-2008 and highway disbursement in 2008 from USDOT-FHWA (2012) 
Gasoline price per gallon in 2008 from U.S. Energy Information Agency (2012). ARRA highway disbursement 
in 2009 from Recovery (2012).
 
Average vehicle miles 
travelled during 1994-
2008 (million miles) 
Gasoline price per 
gallon in 2008 ($ per 
gallon) 
Highway disbursement 
in 2008 ($ million) 
ARRA highway 
disbursement in 2009 
($ million) 
Alabama 56,342 2.669503 1,916 620 
Arizona 50,961 2.681059 2,806 585 
Arkansas 29,824 2.605943 1,051 367 
California 306,611 2.80529 14,697 2,776 
Colorado 42,225 2.665651 1,695 445 
Connecticut 30,278 2.704172 1,370 300 
Delaware 8,559 2.652169 683 122 
Florida 165,681 2.664688 8,698 1,347 
Georgia 102,556 2.69069 3,817 904 
Idaho 13,939 2.703209 802 194 
Illinois 102,733 2.688764 6,299 939 
Indiana 69,706 2.629056 2,732 657 
Iowa 29,464 2.618463 1,505 358 
Kansas 27,952 2.57609 1,487 349 
Kentucky 45,543 2.666614 2,404 448 
Louisiana 42,046 2.684911 2,488 435 
Maine 14,105 2.740767 739 138 
Maryland 51,291 2.657947 2,747 447 
Massachusetts 52,456 2.717654 2,898 385 
Michigan 97,176 2.632908 3,269 896 
Minnesota 52,200 2.598239 2,352 557 
Mississippi 36,324 2.626167 1,346 355 
Missouri 65,806 2.572238 2,545 640 
Montana 10,244 2.698394 651 264 
Nebraska 18,037 2.570312 1,352 230 
Nevada 18,084 2.725358 906 221 
New Hampshire 12,243 2.713802 681 130 
New Jersey 68,290 2.71958 3,921 679 
New Mexico 23,210 2.716691 860 306 
New York 128,855 2.723432 7,537 957 
North Carolina 90,239 2.643501 3,584 744 
North Dakota 7,288 2.677207 471 184 
Ohio 106,521 2.59535 4,631 936 
Oklahoma 43,736 2.580905 1,634 565 
Oregon 33,508 2.825513 1,364 300 
Pennsylvania 102,703 2.642538 5,956 1,035 
Rhode Island 7,947 2.629056 419 137 
South Carolina 45,431 2.665651 1,470 500 
South Dakota 8,382 2.632908 451 214 
Tennessee 65,384 2.640612 1,771 749 
Texas 214,964 2.612685 15,948 2,263 
Utah 22,895 2.675281 1,229 224 
Vermont 7,411 2.820698 395 129 
Virginia 75,544 2.659873 3,875 691 
Washington 53,249 2.75136 3,901 578 
West Virginia 19,356 2.721506 1,208 212 
Wisconsin 56,809 2.642538 2,392 562 
Wyoming 8,398 2.730174 574 185 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Regression Results
The parameter estimates and direct, indirect, and total effects of the SDMP are shown in Table 3. 
The positive and significant spatial lag parameter (ρ) suggests a spatial spillover effect of vehicle 
miles traveled, which is consistent with the results of the spatial LM, Wald, and LR tests discussed 
in the Empirical Model section. Specifically, a 1% increase in vehicle miles traveled in the neighbors 
yielded a 0.20% increase in the own state’s vehicle miles traveled on average.
Table 3: Regression Results of the SDMP Model with Spatial-Fixed Effects and Neighbors 
 Defined by HW1
*Denotes ρ < 0.05 
 
All non-lagged explanatory variables except the length of highway are significant. The signs 
of all the significant variables are in agreement with expectations, which shows that the states with 
higher highway disbursements, per capita incomes, and numbers of licensed drivers tend to use 
highways more. The spatially lagged explanatory variables that are positive and significant (i.e., 
price, length of highway, and number of licensed drivers) reflect positive spatial spillover effects on 
vehicle miles traveled.
An increase by 1% in a state’s one-year lagged highway disbursement increases vehicle 
miles traveled inside the state by 0.03% and across all states by 0.06%. These results suggest that 
government investment in highways perhaps enhances either the quantity or quality (or both) of 
highways and thus increases highway usage. The larger total effect than direct effect of the highway 
disbursement suggests that a state-level shock in highway disbursement has an even larger effect 
on demand for the regional highway network. The results explicitly predict that the 2009 ARRA 
highway disbursement increased highway usage. 
Variables 
Parameter 
estimates 
Direct 
effects 
Indirect 
effects Total effects 
Intercept 2.132* 
(0.842) 
   
ln (Highway disbursement), t-1 0.028* 
(0.008) 
0.029* 
(0.008) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
0.060* 
(0.021) 
ln (Price) -0.997* 
(0.227) 
-0.957* 
(0.220) 
0.763* 
(0.227) 
-0.194* 
(0.034) 
ln (Per capita income) 0.252* 
(0.060) 
0.257* 
(0.058) 
0.160 
(0.075) 
0.417* 
(0.054) 
ln (Length of highway) 0.026 
(0.039) 
0.041 
(0.038) 
0.331* 
(0.061) 
0.372* 
(0.066) 
ln (Licensed drivers)  0.302* 
(0.038) 
0.324* 
(0.037) 
0.466* 
(0.069) 
0.790* 
(0.072) 
HW1*ln (Highway disbursement), t-1 0.020 
(0.016) 
   
HW1*ln (Price) 0.841* 
(0.229) 
   
HW1*ln (Per capita income) 0.082 
(0.076) 
   
HW1*ln (Length of highway) 0.272* 
(0.051) 
   
HW1*ln (Licensed drivers)  0.328* 
(0.064) 
   
HW1*ln (Vehicle miles travelled),   0.201* 
(0.048) 
   
Adjusted R2 0.8277    
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The price per mile has direct, indirect, and total effects on vehicle miles of -0.96, 0.76, and 
-0.19, respectively. These results suggest that the positive indirect effect moderated the close-to-
unit-elastic demand for highway usage to yield an inelastic regional highway demand based on the 
total effect. The positive indirect effect suggests that an increase in the price of highway usage in a 
state increases vehicle miles traveled in other states. This finding implies that highway usage in one 
state is a substitute for highway usage in neighboring states. 
The direct and total effects of per capita income on vehicle miles traveled suggest that a 1% 
increase in per-capita income in a state increased vehicle miles traveled by 0.26% and 0.42% in the 
state and the regional highway systems, respectively. These findings suggest that highway usage is 
a necessity, implying that highway usage does not decrease appreciably during economically tough 
times.
The indirect and total effects of highway length are both positive and significant. These results 
suggest that a 1% increase in highway length in a state increased vehicle miles traveled outside of 
the state and in all 48 states by 0.33% and 0.37%, respectively. These results imply that an increase 
in highway miles within a state increased the accessibility of the highways in neighboring states, 
inducing greater highway use in those states, resulting in an increase in regional highway demand. 
The direct, indirect, and total effects of the number of licensed drivers are all positive and 
significant. This variable plays a crucial role in the regression to control for the effects on vehicle 
miles traveled of the large variation in population size across states. The estimates suggest that a 1% 
increase in the number of licensed drivers in a state increased highway usages in the state, outside 
the state, and in the regional highway system by 0.32%, 0.47% and 0.79%, respectively. The higher 
indirect effect than the direct effect implies a greater effect on vehicle miles traveled in other states 
than within the state.
Simulation Results 
The predicted effects of the 2009 ARRA highway disbursement on vehicle miles traveled, consumer 
surplus, costs, and net benefits in 2010 are presented in Table 4. Results suggest that the ARRA 
highway disbursement increased vehicle miles traveled in the 48 states by 36 billion miles, which 
amounts to a 1.2% increase (i.e., final row of the  column in Table 4). In each state, the predicted increase in vehicle miles traveled with the ARRA highway disbursement (see “ ” 
column in Table 4) is greater than the predicted increase with state i’s own disbursement alone (see 
“ ” column in Table 4), i.e., . The findings support the hypotheses that the 
ARRA highway disbursement shifted the demand curve for highway use upward, and vehicle miles 
traveled in a state increased more when the ARRA highway disbursement was distributed throughout 
all states than if its distribution were limited within that state because of the positive spillover effect.
The increase in vehicle miles traveled in a given state, resulting from that state’s ARRA highway 
disbursement (see “ ” column in Table 4), ranged from 38 million miles for Delaware 
to 1.99 billion miles for California, whereas increases in vehicle miles traveled in a given 
state with the ARRA highway disbursement distributed throughout all states (see 
“ ” column in Table 4) ranged from 78 million miles or Delaware to 3.83 billion miles for 
California. These increases in vehicle miles traveled generated additional consumer surplus between 
$43 million for Delaware and $2.22 billion for California (see “ΔCSown” column in Table 4) when 
the ARRA disbursement was for a given state, and between $87 million and $4.27 billion (see 
“ΔCSall ” column in Table 4) when the ARRA disbursements were distributed to all states. Given the 
implicit costs of negative externalities by state between $7 million and $337 million (see “Implicit 
cost” column in Table 4) and explicit costs of between $122 million and $2.78 billion (see “Explicit 
cost” column in Table 4), total net benefits ranged from –$132 million for New Jersey to $1,158 
million for California, which summed to $8.24 billion over the 48 states (see “Total net benefit” 
column in Table 4). As a result, the net benefit per dollar spent ranged from –$0.34 for Delaware to 
102
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$0.89 for Georgia, with a weighted average net benefit of $0.30 per dollar spent across the 48 states 
(see “Net benefit per dollar spent” column in Table 4). 
The total increase in vehicle miles traveled for the 48 states 
 
of 36.01 billion 
miles generated $38.66 billion in additional consumer surplus . About 50% is attributed 
to benefits received by states other than the one receiving the ARRA disbursement i.e., 17.30 billion 
miles generated $18.59 billion in additional consumer surplus . The considerable 
differences between the increases in predicted vehicle miles traveled in a given state from the ARRA 
disbursement in that state and the predicted vehicle miles traveled when the ARRA disbursement is 
made to all 48 states imply the ARRA highway disbursement had a sizable spatial spillover impact 
on highway demand. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study evaluated the impact of the 2009 ARRA highway disbursement on vehicle miles 
traveled, reflecting a shift in highway demand, in the framework of a cost-benefit analysis. We 
estimated a highway demand equation that employed SDMP based on panel data pertaining to the 
48 U.S. contiguous states for the 1994-2008 period. The estimates from the equation supported 
the hypothesis that different state-level ARRA highway disbursements resulted in different upward 
shifts in the highway demand curves across states. The different effects on the state-level demand 
curves resulted in increases in vehicle miles traveled that were different for each state, generating 
a wide range of predicted increases in consumer surplus across states. The estimated figures and 
explicit and implicit costs associated with the additional highway usage were used to estimate total 
net benefit and net benefit per dollar spent for each state and for the 48 states. Our estimates found 
a total net benefit of $8.2 billion summed across the 48 states resulting from the $27.2 billion 2009 
ARRA highway disbursement, which yielded a weighted average of $0.30 in net benefits per dollar 
spent.
Besides the core finding of a positive net benefit of the ARRA highway disbursement, another 
key finding is that about half of the increased vehicle miles traveled resulting from the ARRA 
highway disbursement was due to the spatial spillover impacts on vehicle miles traveled in states 
neighboring the states where the funds were disbursed. This result implies that about half the benefits 
from improving a state’s highway system are disseminated outside the state to the users of multistate 
highway networks.  
The approach used in this study does not address the question about whether the ARRA was 
beneficial in rehabilitating the deeply depressed economy. However, given the assumptions of the 
SDMP and the ex	post simulated welfare calculations, our estimates suggest a positive national net 
benefit from the ARRA disbursement emanating from increased highway demand. 
Another implication of this study is that the dollar value of the ARRA highway disbursement 
is not the only element that determines the net benefit per dollar spent for a given state. For 
example, Georgia received the highest estimated net benefit per dollar spent of $0.89, whereas 
its ARRA highway disbursement ranked 9th among the 48 states. This finding shows that a state’s 
neighborhood structure also affects its net benefit per dollar spent. Thus, directing funds toward 
improving neighborhood structures could be considered to improve states’ returns per dollar spent 
when future highway funds are disbursed.
A caveat should be noted. The cutoff value iq  when integrating the area shown as 
ΔCSall in 
Figure 1 is an arbitrary value corresponding to a price ceiling of 100 times pi,2010.  Sensitivity analyses 
were performed to test the sensitivity of    to changes in  iq  by assuming iq ’s 
corresponding to price ceilings of 150 and 50 times pi,2010, which are respectively denoted as , 50%iq +  
and 
, 50%iq − . The resulting total net benefits are $11.9 billion and $2.0 billion, respectively, yielding 
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average net benefits per dollar spent of $0.44 and $0.07, respectively. The rank order of state net 
benefit per dollar spent was not substantially changed by varying iq . For the cutoffs q+50 and q-50 
provided the same ranks with the original cutoffs in 40 and 38 of the 48 states, and no state changed 
more than three ranks. The sensitivity analysis implies some confidence in determing which states 
received greater benefits from the 2009 ARRA highway disbursement than others, and that positive 
net benefits per dollar spent are likely. Nevertheless, the aforementioned sensitivity to the cutloff 
value suggests caution when interpreting the magnitude of the additional consumer surplus generated 
by the 2009 ARRA disbursement. 
Endnotes
1. In the United States, an entitlement program is a kind of government program that offers 
individuals personal financial benefits to which an indefinite number of potential beneficiaries 
have a legal right whenever they meet eligibility conditions that are specified by the standing 
law that authorizes the program (Johnson 2013).
2. In fact, equation (2) embraces four different model specifications depending on whether those 
unobserved effects exist;  i) both effects do not exist (μi = 0, and λt = 0), ii) only state-specific 
effects exist (μi ≠ 0, and λt ≠ 0), iii) only time-specific effects exist (μi = 0, and λt ≠ 0), and iv) 
both effects exist (μi ≠ 0, and λt ≠ 0). 
3. The log-likelihood function for equation (3)–—in the following illustration our notation 
subsumes lagged highway disbursements into the vector of other regressors Xi,t—is expressed 
as:
 
(a)  ,
 
 
where the last term on the right hand side of the equation is the Jacobian term that addresses the 
endogeneity of the spatially lagged dependent variable (Anselin 1988). Taking the 
derivative of equation (a) with respect to μi  and solving for μi gives: 
(b)  .
The log-likelihood function (a) is re-expressed by replacing μi with the right hand side of equation (b):
 
(c)  ,
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Estimates of  β, , ρ and σ2 and  maximize the full log-likelihood function (c) and were obtained 
following Elhorst’s (2003) two-step procedure using the concentrated maximum likelihood 
function. 
4. As an illustration, the marginal effects of a change in the price  of highway usage in the 
first state (i = 1) at a point in time are derived to demonstrate differences in demand curves 
among states. For simplicity, we transform equation (3) into N dimensional matrix form: 
(d)  ,
where jN  is an N × 1 vector of ones. Equation (d) can be re-expressed as:
 
 (e) , 
where P is an N × 1 price vector,  βp and ϕp are scalar parameters, and A contains the other terms 
in equation (d) that are not involved in calculating the marginal effects. The total marginal effect 
of a price change on highway demand for the given state (i = 1) is: 
 
(f) , 
where . Equation (f) can be re-expressed as: 
 
 
(g)  . 
 
 
Let ijv be an (i,  j) element of (I – ρW)–1, then equation (g) can be solved as: 
( h ) . 
The first element of the vector in equation (h) denotes the direct effect of P on Q for a given 
state (i = 1), the other elements of the vector represent the indirect effects on Q for the other 
states (i ≠ 1) and the sum of all elements in (h) is the total marginal effect across the 48 states. 
The marginal effects of P in (h) vary across states because the elements in (I – ρW)–1 and the 
elements in W differs in value depending on the spatial unit where an initial shock occurs. 
5. The gasoline-price data in $/gallon were converted to $/mile using approximation of an average 
mileage rate of 25 miles/gallon according to the report by Litman and Doherty (2009).
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